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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY EARLY, 
Respondent, 
-vs.- No. 7725 
KARL L. JACKSON, 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
OPENING STATEMENT 
In replying to the arguments contained in respondent's 
brief, we first desire to call attention to the fact that respondent 
concedes he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law but 
urges that such negligence was not the proximate cause of the 
injuries which he sustained. Each of the four points set out in 
respondent's brief contains the statement that whether the par-
ticular conduct of the plaintiff "proximately contributed to the 
accident" was a question of fact to be decided by the jury. This 
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obviously limits the issue to be decided by the Supreme Court 
to one of whether plaintiH's conduct proximately contributed 
to the accident rather than a determination of whether plaintiff 
was guilty of negligence. Therefore, appellant in the argument 
to follow will call the Court's attention to the evidence, which it 
is claimed shows as a matter of law that the conduct of the 
plaintiff did "proximately contribute" to his own injury, citing 
additional authorities in support of such argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I and II 
PARKING PLAINTIFF'S TRUCK ON THE SOUTH HALF OF 
THE HIGHWAY WITHOUT WARNING LIGHTS OR FLARES 
PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT 
Respondent's first points urge that the parking of 
plaintiff's truck in the position it was placed across the 
highway without flares or other signals, did not, as a 
matter of law, proximately contribute to the accident. 
Respondent concedes that the parking of the truck in this 
position was in violation of the statute and negligence 
but goes on to say "it was nontheless for the jury to de-
termine whether such negligence proximately contributed 
to the accident," citing 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Auto--
mobile Law and Practice, Part 2, Section 2683. Respond-
ent's argument that the jury, by its verdict, found that 
the position in which the Early car was parked on the 
highway did not proximately contribute to the accident 
is begging the question since it is not what the jury found 
that determines the matter, but what the jury should 
have found, as a matter of law, which is before the Su-
preme Court on appeal. 
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Of course, of all of the acts comn1itted by the plain-
tiff, the act of parking his truck was the one most reutote 
in tilne fro1n the accident, and therefore, to that extent 
is the least persuasive of the position taken by appellant 
that plaintiff 'vas negligent as a matter of law, which con-
tributed to his own injuries. We recognize that under 
certain circumstances the parking of a vehicle momen-
tarily on a highway has been held not to be sufficient to 
establish "proximate cause" as a matter of law. The facts 
in this case, however, with respect to the parking of 
plaintiff's truck across the entire width of the highway 
reserved for east-bound traffic in such a position that no 
lights reflected either to the east or tQ the west, but in a 
northerly-southerly direction was such as to compel a 
finding of negligence proximately contributing to the 
accident. 
In the case of Dragotis v. Kennedy, (Minn.) 250 
N.W. 804, a guest in an auton1obile sued to recover for 
damages sustained when he was injured while assisting 
in repairing a flat tire. The· driver of the car in whi-ch 
plaintiff was riding stopped the automobile in the traffic 
lane, making no attempt to get on to the shoulder, the 
left wheels of the car being left within two feet of the 
center line of the pavement. Plaintiff assisted in rep·air-
ing the tire by holding a flashlight with its rays reflected 
on the wheel of the car so that others might remove the 
rim. There were no lights reflected from the rear of the 
automobile. 
An east-bound car being driven by defendant Ander-
son ran into the parked automobile pushing it against 
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the plaintiff, causing his injuries. In affirming a direct 
verdict ag,ainst the plaintiff for contributory negligence, 
the Court said: 
''True, as argued by plaintiff, it is only in a 
clear case where from the facts it is plain that 
reasonable persons can draw only one conclusion 
that the question of contributory negligence be-
comes one of law. But, wide as is the latitude for 
jury consideration, there remains upon trial 
judges and this court the duty to keHp their con-
clusions within the limits of reason. Those limits 
are fixed, not by what any one mind does con-
clude, but by what reasonable minds, functioning 
without bias, may conclude. In each such case 
the question presented is whether there is any 
reasonable ground for absolving the plaintiff 
from negligence. 
"We assume that defendant Anderson was 
negligent. It is obvious that defendant Kennedy 
was grossly so. With opportunity to get off the 
road for a tire change, it is bad enough, the con-
duct utterly inexcusable both as discourtesy and 
negligence, to obstruct a highway in the daytime 
as Kennedy obstructed the road on this occasion. 
Where darkness, wet pavement, and the absence 
of taillight or other signal to warn approaching 
traffic are also factors, it so clearly amounts to 
gross negligence as to defy further attempts at 
polite characterization. Plaintiff, not lacking in 
discernment or other mental capabilities, without 
protest, actively participated in Kennedy's con-
duct. Moreover, he put himself within a foot or 
so of the center line of the pavement, standing or 
'Squatting,' with the rays of the flash-light turned 
downward, ignoring or deliberately risking the 
danger of his situation and that to other cars com-
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ing fron1 the "rest. What, if anything, plaintiff 
and his companions co·uld have done to make the 
risk greater or more ob'lli.ous has not been sug-
gested. True, plaintiff was charged with th.e. duty 
to exercise only due care. But that means a de-
gree of care commensurate with the danger. So, 
where one actively participates, as plaimJiff did, 
in creating an obvious danger, he cannot escape 
being charged with contributory negligence as 
matter of lau\" (Italics added.) 
In that case as in the present case the plaintiff at-
tempted to shift the responsibility to the defendant by 
claiming that he was entitled to assume that other per-
sons approaching would exercise due care. In comment-
ing upon this argument, the Court further stated: 
"That rule has no application where it is 
plain, as it should have been to plaintiff, that even 
the exercise of great care by others may not pre-
vent injury. It is not due care to depend upon 
the exercise of another when such reliance is ac-
companied by obvious danger. Heath v. Wolesky, 
181 Minn. 492, 233 N. W. 239. It would be difficult 
for fancy to suppose circumstances making more 
clearly unreasonable dependence upon careful 
conduct of others than those of this case, which 
plaintiff helped to create." 
The only distinguishing characteristic in that case 
was that it was raining slightly and there was poor visi-
bility. On the other hand, we do not have the factors 
there present as in the instant case of knowledge on the 
part of the injured party that an automobile was ap-
proaching. 
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In the case of Haase v. Willers Truck Service, 
(S.D.) 34 N. W. 2d 313, the plaintiff appealed from a 
judgment directed in favor of the defendants. The col-
lision in that case which caused the death of the decedent 
occurred on U. S. Highway 77, about 2:lj2 miles north-
west of Jefferson, South Dakota. The pavement was 20 
feet wide with shoulders of approximately 8 feet on each 
side and then a 6 foot or 7 foot slope to a ditch which was 
filled with snow. The road was slippery due to ice and 
snow accumulation. The decedent was called to the.scene 
of the accident with a wrecker to herlp remove an auto-
mobile from the ditch. The wrecker truck was parked 
diagonally across a portion of the roadway with the 
front end extending on to the pavement two feet or three 
feet and in such a position so as to block off the lights of 
the Sheriff's car from approaching traffic from the west. 
As in the present case "the head lights of the tow truck 
cast their rays at an angle with the highway and slightly 
up." Decedent got out of the tow truck and attempted to 
pl~ce chains on the right rear wheel when the defendant 
driver operating a truck eastwardly along the highway 
failed to see the parked wrecker truck until he was ap-
proximately one hundred feet or less from it. Defend-
ant's truck struck the wrecker a glancing blow forcing it 
over the body of decedent, resulting in his death. 
In discussing the facts of the case, the Court stated: 
".A seeming contempt for a peril with which 
he was thoroughly familiar was a contributing 
cause of the death of the decedent. He took an 
unnecessary risk. He placed his truck so that it 
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obstructed a portion of the 20-foot ribbon of pa,ve-
ment. No reason is or can be suggested which 
justified hi1n in failing to remove his truck at least 
to the 8-foot shoulder while he was putting on his 
chains. In so doing he failed to conform to the 
statutory standard of conduct prescribed by SDC. 
44.0324. Duncan v. niadrid, 44 N.M. 249, 101 P.2d 
382; Kassela v. Hoseth, 217 Wis. 115, 258 N.W. 
340; Huston v. Robinson, 144 Neb. 553, 13 N.W. 
2d 885. He knew the position of his car because 
he had placed it. He knew that it extended on to 
the pavement and that it Inasked the· blinker light 
on the sheriff's car from the right hand, eastbound 
traffic which his truck obstructed. He knew of the 
heavy load of trucking and other traffic which 
traveled that way. The hazard added by the ice 
was apparent. Because of the ice the most care-
ful driver coming from the we·st was a source of 
danger. He knew that no warning flares or guard 
had been placed to the west. He must have known 
that positioned as he was, the sheriff offered him 
little protection. In the face of all of this he 
crawled under his truck to p·ut a chain· on its right 
wheel. If he had not been under or behind the 
truck or if it had not extended on to the pavement, 
decedent would not have been injured." (Italics 
added.) 
See, also, Russell v. Phillips, (Colo.) 216 P. 2d 424, 
where plaintiff filed an action for damages to his automo-
bile resulting when he ran into defendant's parked truck. 
Defendant filed a counterclaim for personal injuries. 
The trial court directed a verdict in favor_ of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant on defendant's counter-
claim from which the defendant appealed. In affirming 
the judgment the Supreme Court of Colorado stated: 
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"* • • by defendant's own testimony, corro-
borated by all of plaintiff's witnesses who were 
present at the time of the accident, and the state 
patrolman, defendant violated the laws of the 
state of Colorado as provided by the statutes 
thereof, admittedly was guilty of negligence which 
was the. proximate cause of his injuries, and there-
fore·, barred his recovery of dall\ages for injuries 
sustained. 
"T·here being no evidence whatever to sup-
port defendant's counterclaim, and the burden of 
proving the same by a preponderance of evidence 
being on him, the trial court was right in directing 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff thereon." 
In the case of Greisen v. Robbins, (Wash.) 216 P. 2d 
210, the Washington Supreme Court in determining that 
a person, parking a car so as to leave a portion the.~eof 
extending out onto the hard surface of the highway, was 
guilty of contributory negligence "as a matter of law, by 
reason of his positive violation" of the law, gave the fol-
lowing reasoning: 
"The duty of care, imposed by the statute, 
is for the benefit of all users of the highway. 
Proof of a user's negligence, if it is one of the 
proximate causes of the injury, will, of course, de-
feat his own recovery, but that is not to say that 
the violation of the statutes is thereby excused or 
that the respondent owed to the appellant no duty 
to obey the statutes because of his intoxication. 
"The cited statutes are gene-ral in nature, and 
wi.ll not bear a construction which would strike 
from their purview the ap·plicability of the duty 
of care in parking therein imposed as to all negli-
gent persons as a class or to intoxicated persons 
in particular. 
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.. The negligence of others may not be converted 
from a shield into a sword. 
'~Accordingly, 've hold that the respondent 
was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matte·r 
of law, and that the trial court erred in not grant-
ing the motions to dismiss and for judgment n.o.v. 
HThe respondent had parked his car at the 
place of the accident at six o'clock in the evening, 
at the entrance of a private driveway. His negli-
gence must be presun1ed to have continued until 
the time of the collision, in the absence of a show-
ing that he could not have removed it from the 
pavement. He was not in such an inextricable 
position as to be able to invoke the. doctrine of 
last clear chance. Chadwick v. Ek, 1 Wash. 2d 117, 
95 P.2d 398; Coins v. Washington Motor Coach 
C. " ' o., supra. 
Applying the principles of law set forth in the above 
cases to the facts of the instant case, we submit the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Plaintiff was not required by any emergency 
to stop his truck upon the highway. This was done for 
his own convenience and in spite of his knowledge that 
by so doing he was "taking a big chance" and "creating 
a dangerous situation on that highway." (R. 139) 
(2) The truck was parked so that the rear extended 
to the south beyond the hard surface, and the front to 
the north within a foot of the center line, the headlights 
facing just a little west of north. (R. 106, 107) The hard 
surface of the road was slightly rounded so that the rear 
of the truck would be lower than the front, causing the 
beam from the headlights to be p-rojected upward and 
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making it impossible for one approaching to see the truck 
upon the highway. While several witnesses testified that 
after the collision they were~ able to see a light at the 
scene of the accident from some distance away, none of 
them was able to identify the source of the light until just 
before. reaching the· culvert. 
( 3) No flares or other warning devices were put 
out to warn approaching traffic of the obstruction on the 
highway. 
( 4) Although plaintiff knew that he was stopping 
on a through highway (the only one leading from Lake-
town to Garden City and cities further north in Idaho) 
he failed to leave sufficient roon1 for cars to pass; failed 
to keep the motor running on the truck although he 
claimed he was only going to be stopped for four or five 
minutes; (R. 139) and failed to keep a lookout for ap-
proaching vehicles and therefore saw no one until he 
heard defendant's truck approaching. (R. 110) At that 
time the approaching truck was straight west about % 
mile ( R. 135), coming toward the plain tiff. 
III 
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT IN PROCEEDING WESTWARDLY 
ON THE NORTH HALF OF THE PAVED HIGHWAY 
PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT 
In connection with the foregoing point, respondent 
has cited the case of Roach v. Kyremes, Utah, (1949) 211 
P. 2d 181, and Chatelain v. Thackery, 98 Utah 525, 100 P. 
2d 191. In each of those cases the injured person was not 
walking on the hard-surfaced portion of the highway but 
was walking on the shoulder so that the facts are dis-
10 
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tinguishable from those present in the instant matter. 
In the Thackery Case the court pointed out that 
there was a conflict in the evidence as to the position 
of the Chatelains at the moment of impact, Mr. Chate~ain 
testifying that he and his wife were "at a point about 
three feet east of the hard-surfaced part of the highway 
on the gravelled shoulder thereof." 
In holding that the matter was one for the jury, the 
court stated: 
"As appears from the rather detailed state-
ment of facts given at the beginning of this opin-
ion, the evidence bearing upon that matter was in 
conflict, both as to matters of direct testimony 
and inferences to be drawn from facts and circum-
stances in evidence. Under such circumstances 
the trial court properly submitted the question 
of contributory negligence to the jury." 
The same situation existed in the Roach Case where 
the plaintiff and another witness both testified that they 
were walking on the shoulder on the west side of the 
street looking behind them for approaching traffic. In 
the instant case the testimony of the plaintiff is that up·on 
alighting from his truck, he proceeded over to the north 
half of the paved part of the highway and ran toward the 
west in the direction from which defendant was ap--
proaching. ( R. 112) 
In response to questions asked by his own counsel, 
plaintiff testified: (R. 119, 120) 
"Q. And then you ran down the highway for a 
distance of from 100 to 140 feet in the direc-
tion which the vehicle was traveling, is that 
correct~ 
11 
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A. The op·posite direction. 
Q. Well, I mean toward the vehicle 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And during all of that time were you ob-
serving the vehicle~ 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. And you had an occasion to observe the man-
ner in which the vehicle was closing the gap 
between you and it, is that correct·i 
A. Ye·s sir.'' 
As to his position on the hard surface he testified: 
(R. 112) 
"Q. And what was your position on the highway 
with reference to the highway at the tune 
when those brakes screeched and you say that 
is the last remembrance you have 1 
A. Well, I was right over against the north edge 
of the oil." 
On cross-examination he further testified as follows: 
(R. 148) 
"Q. Well, you don't know whether you got out of 
that truck and ran over to the extreme right 
side and then down the highway or whether 
you went diagonally across, or otherwise, do 
you~ 
A. Well, I just think I went on that side, yes 
s1r. 
Q. Well, I don't ask you about what you think. 
I ask you what your memory is. 
A. That is my re·collection; that I ran across the 
road and down. 
12 
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Q. But you never did get off the· paved portion 
of the highway, did you 1 
A. I wouldn't know. 
Q. What is that Y 
A. I wouldn't know. 
Q. Now when you ran down there he was on 
the south side of the highway, wasn't he 1 
.... \.. I presume he was. 
Q. ~fr. Early, do you remember after I ques-
tioned you that day, I think that was in the 
Federal Building, that Mr. Strong asked you 
some questions about your course down the 
highway and here is his examination ; by Mr. 
Strong. This is on page 37. Question, and 
this is by Mr. Strong: 'I have got one ques-
tion I want to ask you. At the time when you 
were struck by the car what was your position 
on the highway with reference to the paved 
portion of the road and the north shoulder~ 
Where were you on the road f And the an-
swer: 'Well, I was over-' and then you 
hesitated, 'I was as close as I could get to 
the north side.' Question: 'Of the oiled road~' 
and your answer: 'Yes sir, and still on the 
oil.' So you were on the oil when you were 
hit, weren't you 1 
A. I wouldn't know that. 
Q. Well, you answered Mr. Strong one time that 
you were~ 
A. Yes sir." 
Not only do we have plaintiff's testimony as to his 
position on the highway, but we also have the physical 
13 
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evidence as to the course of travel of defendant's truck 
from the time the brakes were applie,d until it came to 
rest in the slough on the north part of the right-of-way. 
RoJand A. Reese, the State highway patrolman who 
visited the scene of the accident approximately two 
days after it happened, testified that he saw two tire 
marks starting in the middle of the road "straddle" the 
middle line at a point approximately 114 feet west of 
the culvert (R. 166, 169). ]-,rom there the brake marks 
proceHded in a straight line toward the northeast part 
of the highway so that by the tiine they reached the 
culvert they were entirely off the hard surface and on 
the graveled shoulder. 
Other evidence; in the record shows conclusively 
that plaintiff was on the hard surface, or oiled portion, 
of the road. In this regard, we call the court's attention 
to Exhibit ____ , which is the photo of the defendant's truck. 
This exhibit shows the imprint of plaintiff's body in the 
grill and hood just off the center line of the vehicle, 
unmistakably the point of impact. All the evidence is 
that defendant's truck did not leave the oiled surface 
of the highway until it was approximately opposite the 
plain tiff's parked truck. 
Plaintiff was not only on the hard surface of the 
highway, but was necessarily several feet in from the 
north edge, because he was struck at least two or three 
feet in from the left front edge of defendant's truck, 
which in turn was well on the hard surface at the time 
of impact. 
Plaintiff's hat and gloves were found at a point 
14 
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100 feet 'vest of the culvert, indicating that he must 
have been at least that far from his truck when he was 
struck ( R. 187, 202-203). 
It is apparent fron1 this evidence that the farther 
west from the truck plaintiff had run before he was 
struck, the closer to the middle of the hard surface of 
the highway he n1ust have been. If he had reached a 
point 100 to 140 feet 'vest of the culvert before he was 
hit, he 'Yas necessarily almost in the middle of the high-
way. On the other hand if he was approximately 50 
feet west of the culvert he would have been near the 
middle of the north lane. Too, the evidence discloses 
that the farther one went to the west from the culvert 
the wider the shoulder became, but that the shoulder 
was three feet to four feet in width (R. 103). Exhibit 
2 indicates the general contour of the hard surface and 
the extent of the shoulders on either side of the black 
top. 
We, therefore, have the plaintiff running in a west-
erly direction on the north half of the hard surface, 
toward the approaching vehicle, after he by his own 
carelessness had created a dangerous situation with 
respect to other vehicles attempting to use the roadway. 
Certainly he is in no better position than a casual pedes-
trian walking along the roadway on the right side of the 
road when the statute requires such pedestrian to use 
the left side of the roadway in order to be aware of 
approaching traffic. 
On this point, in addition to the authorities cited 
in appellant's brief several other cases have been found 
15 
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de·aling with the question of whether the walking on the 
hard surface of the highway would, as a matter of law, 
bar a recovery against the drive·r of the vehicle collid-
ing with such person. 
In the case of South Hill Motor Company v. Gor-
don, 172 V a. 193, 200 S.E. 637, it appeared that plaintiff 
who was walking on the edge of the hard surface high-
way was struck by defendant's automobile coming from 
the opposite direction. In that case plaintiff testified 
that he saw defendant's automobile approaching when it 
was four hundred yards distant; that he continued to 
watch it until it was approximately ten to fifteen steps 
away, at which time he pulled the brin1 of his hat down 
in order to shade his eyes, still watching the approach-
ing automobile and maintaining his position. He further 
testified that he did not step to the left because he 
thought the car would clear him. 
In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and direct-
ing a verdict to be entered for the defendant, the Court 
held: 
"Under normal conditions, the pedestrian 
must keep as near as reasonably possible to the 
extreme left side or edge of the highway, and the 
operator of a motor vehicle must drive upon his 
right-hand side of the highway. And when it 
happens that both of them desire, or require, to 
use, at the same time, that portion of the. high-
way prescribed for their use, each of them must 
exercise his respective right to the use with due 
regard for the right of the other. Neither the 
pede1strian nor the operator of a vehicle., traveling 
along the portion of the highway prescribed for 
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the use of each of them has a 'right of way' there-
on over the other, except as expressly provided 
by statute. The mere right to travel on a specified 
portion of a highway is not to be confused with 
a 'right of way' thereon superior to the rights 
of others also entitled to use the highway. The 
right to the use is an equal and coordinate right. 
Both persons and operators of vehicles are held 
to the exercise of ordinary care and are bound 
to respect the rights of each other. And when 
either observes danger to or from the other, he 
must exercise ordinary and reasonable care to 
avoid danger. The duty of each to avoid givilng 
or receiving injury is reciprocal. * * * The plain-
tiff can make no stronger case than is shown by 
his own testimony. He is bound by his account 
of what he saw and did. His own evidence dis-
closes that he was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as an efficient and p-roximate cause of the 
collision. * * * Assuming that the defendant 
here was negligent in operating his motor vehicle 
under the conditions re·cited, he had no knowledge, 
or anything to put him on notice, that the plain-
tiff was unable to protect himself. There is no 
reason for discrediting his testimony, that he 
was unable to see the plaintiff in time to save 
him from injury on account of the lights on the 
approaching cars. There was no time for effective 
action after the discovery of the peril of the 
plaintiff. In order to apply the doctrine of last 
clear chance, the burden was upon the plaintiff 
to show affirmatively by a preponderance of the 
evidence that. the defendant might have avoided 
the collision by the use of ordinary care after 
he discovered, or should have discovered the 
peril of the plaintiff. The doctrine of the last 
elear chance, as ap-plying to both parties, has 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been so often discus~sed by us that it is doubtful 
if anything more of value can be added." (Italics 
added) 
In the above case plaintiff was actually walking 
on the left side of the highwa.y as required by statute 
but he failed to move! over or get out of the. way of the 
approaching vehicle which he· saw at all times. Except 
for that fact and for the further fact that there was no 
other obstruction on the highway, the facts in the two 
cases are very similar. We believe· the circumstances in 
the instant case are much stronger for appellant than 
those in the Gordon case. 
In Flaumers v. Samuels, 4 Wash. 2d 609, 104 P. 2d 
484, the plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries 
occasioned when he was struck by an automobile while 
walking along the left portion of that part of the divided 
part of the highway reserved for automobiles proceeding 
in the same direction in which he was traveling. The 
highway was a six lane highway divided by a strip o.f 
gravel in the center. He was pulling a small cart, having 
one wheel of the cart upon the pavement and one wheel 
upon the gravel shoulde-r. Defendant was traveling in 
the center traffic lane and moved to the left to pass a 
slower moving vehicle when he was confronted with the 
cart being pulled by plaintiff. Although defendant at-
tempted to turn to the right he was unable to miss 18trik-
ing plain tiff's cart, throwing it forward against the 
plaintiff. The case was tried to a jury resulting in a 
verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court 
discussed only the proposi~tion of contributory negligence 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the plaintiff and held, quoting from an earlier case 
of Benson v. Anderson, 1~9 Wash. 19, 223 P.163: 
"The statutory enactments regulating traffic 
upon the public highways are Inade to be obeyed. 
They are the outgrowth of necessity. On the 
observance of then1 depends the safety of the 
users of such highways. Failure to obey them 
not only endangers the safety of the person 
guilty of the disobedience, but it endangers the 
safety of others using them in a lawful manner. 
Courts, therefore, should not look lightly upon 
infractions of these regulations. One injured 
while in the act of disobedience· of them should 
be compelled to show with clearness that his act 
in no way contributed to his injury." 
In applying the foregoing principle'S to the facts in 
the case before it the Washington Supreme Court held : 
"It plainly appears from respondent's own 
testimony and from other undisputed facts of the 
case not only that respondent was guilty of viola-
tion of a positive statute, but also that such viola-
tion was a substantial factor in producing the 
injuries. This being so we are compelled to hold, 
as a matter of law, that respondent was guilty of 
contributory negligence and cannot recover." 
In Anderson vs. Holsteen (Ia.), 26 N.W. 2d 855, 
the pedestrian was injured while walking on the right 
side of a gravel highway eighteen inches to two fee·t from 
the edge. The defendant, operating an automobile in the 
same direction approached the point where plaintiff was 
proceeding. Another pedestrian walking a short distance 
behind the plaintiff step·ped to one side upon hearing 
defendant's car, but plaintiff failed to move and was 
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struck. At the· conclusion of plain~iff's evidence, the trial 
court directed a verdict for the defendant from which 
the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Iowa in 
discussing 'the; case assumed that defendant was negligent 
in one or more of the particulars charged and considered 
only the proposition of whether plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. In so doing, 
the court stated : 
"Plaintiff urges that the violation of the 
statute is only prima facie evidence of negligence. 
Citing McElhinney v. Knittle, 199 Iowa 278, 201 
N.W. 587; Lang v. Siddall, 218 Iowa 263, 254 
N.W. 783. In this case, under the~ facts, there 
is little difference between negligence per se in 
violation of a statute and prima facie evidence of 
negligence. On a showing of violation of the 
statute, as in this case, the burden is upon the 
plaintiff to justify such violation. "The effect 
of the statute and the ordinance is to lay the 
burden orf justification upon the man who was on 
the wrong side of the street." He.rdman, Adm'r, v. 
Zwart, 167 Iowa 500, 149 N.W. 631, 632." 
See also Herzberg vs. White (Ariz.), 66 P. (2d) 253, 
in which we believe the principle is very similar to the 
case here before the court. 
The pertinent facts of that case are that the defen-
dant had received a puncture while proceeding on the 
highway in the State of Arizona, had pulled o:ver to the 
right of the traveled portion of the~ highway, which was 
36 feet wide and consisted of four traveling lanes, but 
left his automobile from 3 to 8 feet on to the right most 
lane of the highway. The defendant had then proceeded 
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to repair the left rear tire which had be·come punctured 
and the deceased, for "'"hom the suit 'vas brought, stood 
in the next lane of traffic and held a flashlight for the . 
defendant. Another automobile proceeding along the 
san1e highway struck both the deceased and the defen-
dant. Since the identity of this automobile was ne:ver 
determined, the suit "'"as brought for the wrongful death 
of the person holding the flashlight against the defen-
dant, 'Yho was the operator of the parked vehicle. 
The court held as a matter of law that the defendant · 
was guilty of negligence in parking his car upon the 
traveled portion of the highway without lights and also 
held that a finding that this negligent conduct was a 
proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's intestate, 
who was holding the flashlight, was justified. 
Because of a constitutional provision requiring the 
jury to pass upon the defense of contributory ne.gligence 
and making it a question of fact in all cases, the court 
could not rule on contributory negligence but neverthe-
less the court further held that if such conduct was 
found by a jury to be negligent that such conduct was 
necessarily a proximate cause of the deceased's death 
and stated its conclusion as follows: 
"We come then to the other defense urged 
by defendant which is, in substance, that his neg-
ligence was not the proximate cause of the aeci-
dent. It is the law that where an injury is pro-
duced by an intervening and superseding cause, 
even though the original negligence may have 
been a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury, the original actor is not legally respon-
sible therefor. 
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"Any reasonable person must be held to have 
known and anticipated, therefore., that cars might 
pass on the pavement where defendant had parked 
his car almos't momentarily. Under such circum-
stances, the parking of the car partially on the 
paved portion of the highway after dark, with 
the lights out, created a situation of such danger 
that an ordinarily prudent man should have 
anticipated that persons standing on the pave-
ment to the left of the car might be struck at any 
time by a passing automobile. It thus appears 
that the active intervening cause, being of such 
a nature tltat it could or should have been reason-
ably anticipated by defendant, was not a super-
seding cause." 
It is to be noted that in the instant case before this 
court the activities of plaintiff are identical with the 
conduct of both the defendant and the plaintiff's in-
testate and in principle it can be seen that the act of 
parking the car without lights on the highway is a con-
tributing cause to an injury to a person standing in the 
lane to the left of the parked car, and similarly the act 
of standing in the lane next to the car so parked is a 
contributing cause to any injuries received by such 
person. We subrn.it, therefore, in the instant case, that 
both the acts of negligence of the plaintiff, that is the 
parking without lights upon the traveled portion of the 
highway and proceeding down the other traveled lane of 
the highway, as a matter of law, contributed proximately 
to his injuries. 
See also Starndridge v. Godsey, 187 Tenn. 522, 226 
S.W. 2d 277; Henry v. Hallquist, 226 Minn. 39, 31 N.W. 
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2d 641; Wells v. Burton Lines, Inc., 228 N.c·. 422, 45 
S.E. 2d 569; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714, 153 S.E. 
691; Steen v. Hedstrom, 189 Wash. 75, 63 P. 2d 507. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we again call attention of the Court 
to the fact that the plaintiff in this case acted in viola-
tion of several laws designed for his own safety and pro-
tection. He set the stage·for the things which were later 
to happen. He did it knowingly and with his eyes open. 
Conscious of this dangerous situation, when he heard 
the defendant's truck approaching, he lost his head and 
thereby nearly lost his life. Being the primary factor and 
moving force in the entire chain of circumstances, he 
should not now be allowed to recover from the other 
participant who, of the two, had the less opportunity to 
avoid the accident. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT J. JENSEN, 
R. A. BURNS, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON, 
Attorneys for Appella;n,t. 
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